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1. INTRODUCTION
From the dark controversy surrounding American efforts to combat
terrorism emerged the claims of several suspected terrorists, who contended that the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA,
transported them to "black sites" where they were tortured and interrogated in contravention of international law.' The CIA refers to this prac* Senior Notes & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate,
2011, University of Miami School of Law. I thank Professor Elizabeth M. Iglesias and the editors

of the University of Miami Law Review for their guidance and insight. I also thank my family for
their encouragement and support.
1. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008),
rev'd, 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), and affd on reh'g en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (a
claim for damages by five plaintiffs who were separately renditioned and tortured); El-Masri v.
United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (a claim for damages by an individual who was
renditioned to a CIA prison after being captured in Macedonia); see also Jamie A. Baron
Rodriguez, Article & Essay, Torture on Trial: How the Alien Tort Statute May Expose the
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tice as the extraordinary rendition program.2 In Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan,Inc., five plaintiffs alleged that they were victims of the CIA's
extraordinary rendition program.' The plaintiffs sought damages from
Jeppesen Dataplan, a Boeing subsidiary, asserting that publicly available
evidence showed that Jeppesen provided flight planning and logistical
support for the flights that carried the plaintiffs to their detention and
torture.' The victims told a similar story. They were kidnapped or
detained while traveling in a foreign country.' Drugged and blindfolded,
they were dressed in jumpsuits and diapers, and flown to a secret location.' Upon their arrival, they were held in a tiny cell and tortured.' The
abuse aimed to retrieve information about suspected terrorist activities.'
The interrogation techniques included brutal beatings and bone breaking.9 The rendition victims also experienced electrocution, starvation,
and sleep deprivation by constant light or darkness and exposure to earpiercing recordings twenty-four hours a day.10
The United States intervened before Jeppesen answered the complaint and moved for dismissal, asserting the state secrets privilege."
The District Court for the Northern District of California granted the
motion to intervene and dismissed, holding that the very subject matter
of the suit was a state secret because it involved allegations of CIA conduct and covert operations in foreign countries.12 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,
holding that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature unless the
subject matter of the suit was a contract for espionage between the plaintiff and the government.'
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Mohamed represented a significant
change in the recent case law applying the state secrets doctrine in suits
Government's Illegal "Extraordinary Rendition" Program Through Its Use of a Private

Contractor, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 189, 197 (2007) (explaining that the CIA's secret
detention facilities abroad are referred to as "black sites").
2. David Weissbrodt & Amy Berquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis,

19 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 123, 127-28 (2006) (explaining the process of rendition as the forced
transfer of a person to another country for interrogation and detention and that extraordinary
rendition is used by the government to avoid scrutiny for the use of torture and illegal
interrogation techniques).
3. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 949.
4. Id. at 951.
5. Id. at 949-50.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

12. Id. at 951-52.
13. Id. at 961.
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involving allegations of torture because it held that dismissal at the
pleading stage was improper.14 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the state secrets privilege created a circuit split with the Fourth
Circuit's decision in El-Masri v. United States, which held that the lower
court properly dismissed a civil claim by a victim of the CIA's
extraordinary rendition program at the pleading stage because the matter
could not be litigated without disclosing state secrets. However, this
circuit split ceased to exist when the Ninth Circuit changed its position
en banc and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the case at

the outset.16
Despite the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision, the circuit split that
arose between the Ninth and Fourth Circuits reveals an important tension in our current law concerning when executive claims of secrecy can
bar access to the courts and how these claims should be evaluated by the
judiciary. Despite the Obama Administration's promises for greater
transparency and stricter standards for policing extreme interrogation,17
the government continues to invoke the state secrets privilege and assert
that certain matters cannot be heard because the very subject matter of
the suit is a state secret."s
This note argues that the state secrets doctrine currently functions
to keep questionable government actions out of the public view, effectively controlling the public perception and discourse surrounding the
United States government's actions in the War on Terror. Further, this
note argues that the state secrets doctrine must be clarified and reformed
to give victims of torture an opportunity to be heard and to encourage
the United States government to take accountability for its actions. Part
II sets forth the relevant law leading up to Mohamed. It provides an
analysis of the leading standard and the recent cases and theories that
depart from the leading standard. Part III provides a detailed discussion
of the Mohamed decision from the district court ruling through the Ninth
Circuit appeal. Part IV provides an analysis of Mohamed. Part IV first
14. See id.

15.
16.
17.
that no

El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007).
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010).
See Exec. Order No. 13,491, Sec. 3 (b), 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (setting forth
individual will be subjected to unlawful interrogation techniques); see also EDWARD C.

Lu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE AND OTHER LIMITs ON LITIGATION

INVOLVING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 12 (2009) (describing the proposed changes of H.R. 984 as
well as the current state of the law in this area).
18. Mark Wilson, Obama's Use of State Secrets Is More of the Same, DEMOCKRACY, Mar. 3,
(criticizing
2009, http://demockracy.com/obamas-use-of-state-secrets-is-more-of-the-same/
President Obama for following the Bush trend of expansive invocation of the state secrets
privilege and for the Obama Administration's assertions that the executive has the final say on this
matter and that it is non-reviewable by the courts).
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explains how the state secrets doctrine controls public exposure to the
United States government's participation in torture by keeping damages
claims by victims of extraordinary rendition out of the courts. Part IV
then explains the need for reform through in camera judicial review and
clarification of the doctrine. Part V reaffirms these arguments and
briefly concludes.

II.
A.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE
SECRETS DocTRINE

Totten and Reynolds: Defining the State Secrets Doctrine

In Totten v. United States, the foundational case on the state secrets
doctrine, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "public policy
forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of
which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law
itself regards as confidential."

Totten involved a suit by the administra-

tor of an estate to collect payment for services rendered by the decedent,
William A. Lloyd.2 0 Lloyd had a contract with President Lincoln to gain
information about the strategies and whereabouts of the Southern army
and report this information back to the President. 2'
The Supreme Court illustrated its continued reliance on the Totten
holding recently in Tenet v. Doe, holding that a suit involving a government contract for espionage should be barred outright in order to keep
the espionage relationship between the plaintiff and the government a
secret.2 2 Tenet involved a husband and wife's claim for financial support
against the CIA after years of espionage services.2 3 In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court discussed the conflict that is at the center of the
current debate concerning the scope of the state secrets doctrine; specifically, whether Totten permits a categorical bar to suits where the subject
matter involves military secrets, or whether Totten only permits a categorical bar on suits involving government contracts for espionage. 24
The conflict as to the scope of the state secrets doctrine is perhaps a
19. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876).
20. Id. at 105.

21. Id. at 105-06.
22. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005).
23. Id. at 5.

24. See id. at 8-9. In the en banc decision of Mohamed, the Ninth Circuit declined to address
the scope of the Totten doctrine, instead ruling that dismissal was warranted under Reynolds. The
fact that there is so much confusion regarding the scope of the seminal case on the state secrets
doctrine shows that this area of the law is highly uncertain and in desperate need of clarification.
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("We do
not resolve the difficult question of precisely which claims may be barred under Totten because
application of the Reynolds privilege leads us to conclude that this litigation cannot proceed
further.").
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result of the tension between the Totten holding and the two-step test set
forth in United States v. Reynolds,25 which is the modem seminal case
on invocation of the state secrets privilege. In Reynolds, the Supreme
Court held that courts should follow a two-step test in evaluating a claim
of privilege under the state secrets doctrine. 2 6 First, there must be a formal claim of privilege by the head of the department who has control
over the matter. 27 Second, the court must determine whether the circumstances warrant a claim of privilege without disclosing the information
the privilege is meant to protect. 28 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court outlined the flexibility of the second inquiry, stating that if
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged ... the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers. 29
Under Reynolds, the court analyzes whether the government properly invoked the claim of privilege and will exclude the evidence
accordingly. 3 0 This does not call for a complete dismissal of a case,
merely for exclusion of privileged evidence." For example, Reynolds
involved a tort claim by several surviving spouses of men who died in a
plane crash where the government was testing secret defense equipment.3 2 The government claimed the state secrets privilege as to the offiHowever, the government offered alternative
cial crash reports.
evidence in the form of eyewitnesses that could testify to the non-privileged events.34 The Supreme Court stated that the case could proceed
using the witnesses instead of the privileged crash reports.
The State Secrets Doctrine and the War on Terror: Civil Claims
by Victims of ExtraordinaryRendition

B.

Recent cases involving claims by victims of the government's
extraordinary rendition program illustrate the gaps in state secrets doctrine jurisprudence. Mainly, these cases address whether a suit involving
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

345 U.S. 1 (1953).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 11.
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privileged information about the government's rendition program should
be barred outright in accordance with a broad reading of Totten, or
whether the evidence should be evaluated piece by piece, allowing
plaintiffs the opportunity to bring their claims using non-privileged evidence in line with Reynolds. That is, a broad reading of Totten would
permit the dismissal of a case outright if the very subject matter of the
suit was a state secret. The following cases address whether a private
contractor's involvement in rendition is so confidential that it warrants
dismissal at the pleading stage.
In El-Masri v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the lower court properly dismissed a civil
claim by a victim of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program at the
pleading stage because the matter could not be litigated without disclosing state secrets.36 The case involved Khaled El-Masri's civil action
against the former director of the CIA, three corporate defendants, and
several employees of the CIA.37 El-Masri alleged that officers detained
him while traveling in Macedonia, turned him over to CIA operatives,
and then transported him to a facility in Afghanistan where the CIA held
him for roughly five months.38 El-Masri contended that his captors
drugged and beat him, confined him in an unsanitary cell, and interrogated him about his involvement in terrorist activities." In the lower
court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States had intervened and claimed that the state secrets
privilege precluded litigation of El-Masri's claim because it would
reveal privileged information about the CIA's extraordinary rendition
program.40 The lower court agreed with the United States and dismissed
El-Masri's claim.4 1
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, El-Masri acknowledged that some
information that would help his claim may be privileged, but challenged
the lower court's determination that his claim was so entwined with state
secrets that it precluded litigation of the matter.4 2 However, the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the lower court's dismissal of the case, citing several
of that court's state secrets decisions where privileged information was
so central to the dispute that it could not be litigated once the executive
properly made a claim of privilege.4 3
36. EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007).
37. Id. at 299.
38. Id. at 300.
39. Id.

40. Id. at 301.
41. Id. at 302.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 306-07 (citing Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir.
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The Fourth Circuit summarized the case law on the matter, explaining that information is unavailable once the privilege is properly invoked
and "a proceeding in which the state secrets privilege is successfully
interposed must be dismissed if the circumstances make clear that the
privileged information will be so central to the litigation that any attempt
to proceed will threaten that information's disclosure."" Thus, the court
could dismiss El-Masri's claim if privileged information was central to
his claim. EI-Masri took the position that United States government officials, reports in the media, and foreign governmental entities had already
made many of the facts essential to his suit public.4 5 However, in line
with the other decisions dismissing cases at the pleading stage where
privileged information was central to the litigation, the Fourth Circuit
held that El-Masri could not litigate his claim without revealing privileged information; specifically, CIA operations relating to the extraordinary rendition program.4 6
Recently, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. created a circuit

split with the Fourth Circuit's holding in El-Masri. Both cases
involved suits by torture victims of the CIA's extraordinary rendition
program that were dismissed at the pleading stages. However, on appeal,
the Fourth Circuit in El-Masri agreed with the district court and affirmed
dismissal at the pleading stage," whereas the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed
held that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature unless the subject matter of the suit was a contract for espionage.4 9
III.

MOHAMED

V. JEPPESEN DATAPLAN,

EXECUTIVE'S

INC.: A

CHECK ON THE

INVOCATION OF THE STATE

SECRETS PRIVILEGE

Five plaintiffs, Binyam Mohamed, Abou Elkassim Britel, Ahmed
Agiza, Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, and Bisher Al-Rawi, alleged
that the United States CIA worked with foreign governments to conduct
the extraordinary rendition program in order to gain information from
suspected terrorists by using interrogation methods in violation of inter1980) (dismissing a claim for tortious interference with a Navy contract because state secrets were
integral to making a prima facie case at trial)).
44. Id. at 307-08 (citing Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005) (dismissing an
African-American CIA officer's title VII action because state secrets in the form of CIA
performance reports and witnesses whose identities were confidential were central to successful
litigation of the claim).
45. Id. at 308.
46. Id. at 311.
47. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009).
48. EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311.
49. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 962.
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national law."o The plaintiffs brought suit aganst Jeppesen Dataplan,
alleging that publicly available evidence showed that Jeppesen provided
flight planning and logistical support for the flights that carried the
plaintiffs to their detention and torture.51 The plaintiffs sought damages
under the Alien Tort Statute 5 2 for Jeppesen's participation in their forced
abduction and involvement in their torture and cruel and inhuman treatment in contravention of international law . The United States intervened before Jeppesen answered the complaint and moved for dismissal,
asserting the state secrets privilege.5 4 The District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the motion to intervene and dismiss, holding that the very subject matter of the suit was a state secret because it
involved allegations of CIA conduct and covert operations in foreign
countries. However, the district court declined to address whether the
invocation of the state secrets privilege as to specific privileged evidence
would prevent the plaintiffs from making a prima facie case and the
plaintiffs appealed.5 6
Although the plaintiffs were detained in different locations and at
different times, their experiences were eerily similar.5 ' Agiza was captured in Sweden where he was seeking asylum. He was transferred to
American custody, where he was held in a small, windowless cell in
Egypt for five weeks.5 ' During this time, he was repeatedly beaten and
shocked through electrodes that were attached to his body.59 Agiza's
detention spanned over two years and culminated in a six-hour military
trial that resulted in a fifteen-year sentence in an Egyptian prison.60
These facts were publicly acknowledged by the Swedish government.6 1
Britel was arrested in Pakistan on immigration charges and transferred to American custody.62 Britel was blindfolded, shackled, dressed
50. Id. at 943.
51. Id. at 951. The plaintiffs asserted that they could prove their claims through publicly
available evidence and thus did not need to reveal any secret government information to prove
their claims. For example, the details of plaintiff Agiza's detention and torture were publicly
acknowledged by the Swedish government. Id. at 949. To prove Jeppesen's involvement, the
plaintiffs also cited a report by a former Jeppesen employee, who stated that the director of
planning services told him, "'We do all the extraordinary rendition flights,' which he also referred
to as 'the torture flights' or 'spook flights."' Id. at 951.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
53. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 951.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 951-52.
56. Id. at 952.
57. Id. at 949.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in a diaper and overalls, and flown to Morocco.6 3 In Morocco, he was
beaten severely, threatened with sexual torture, and deprived of food and
sleep.' Britel eventually signed a false confession and was sentenced to
fifteen years in a Moroccan prison. 5
Officials arrested Mohamed in Pakistan on immigration charges.
He was flown to Morocco where he was beaten and tortured. 66 The
Moroccan authorities cut him with a scalpel on his body, pouring hot
stinging substances into the wounds. 67 He was blindfolded and handcuffed and forced to listen to loud music day and night. 68 Eighteen
months later he was returned to American custody in Afghanistan where
he was subjected to recordings of screaming women and children in
complete darkness day and night.69 Mohamed was then transferred to
Guantanomo Bay, Cuba, for five years before being released.70
Al-Rawi was arrested in Gambia, then shackled, blindfolded, and
dressed in a diaper and overalls, and transported to Afganistan." He was
subjected to complete darkness and made to listen to loud recordings
day and night, depriving him of sleep.72 Al-Rawi was also beaten and
subjected to other torture.73 He too was transferred to Guantanamo Bay
before his release.7 4
Bashmilah was apprehended in Jordan and transferred to American
custody. He was then flown to Afghanistan like the other plaintiffs.75 He
was subjected to twenty-four-hour darkness and noise, then constant
light and noise.7 6 He was also shackled in painful positions. Basmilah
attempted suicide three times in an attempt to escape these conditions.
He was transferred to other CIA prisons before being convicted of a
trivial crime.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by outlining the two
diverging views of the state secrets doctrine in Totten and Reynolds.7 9
63. Id.
64. Id. at 950.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 952.
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That is, Totten requires that a suit involving a secret agreement between
the plaintiff and the government be dismissed on the pleadings because
the very subject matter of the suit is a state secret.so In contrast, Reynolds prevents only discovery of evidence that threatens national security;
and the litigation may proceed as if the evidence is unavailable so long
as the plaintiffs can prove their case in the absence of the privileged
evidence, and the defendants are not deprived of evidence that prevents
them from making a complete defense.
Jeppesen and the government maintained that Totten barred the suit
because it was "predicated on the existence of an alleged secret agreement with the government."8 2 The Ninth Circuit declined to extend Totten's holding to the plaintiffs' suit against Jeppesen because Totten
applied to secret contracts between a plaintiff and the government, not as
between a plaintiff and a third party that had a secret contract with the
government. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, Totten would
bar a suit by Jeppesen against the government because Jeppesen was a
party to a secret contract with the government.8 1 Conversely, Totten
would not apply to the third-party plaintiffs because the plaintiffs did not
willfully enter an agreement that "supports a conclusion that their 'lips
[were] to be forever sealed respecting' the claim on which they sue[d],
such that filing [the] lawsuit would in itself defeat recovery."8
The Ninth Circuit also declined to read Totten broadly as a complete bar on suits where the government labels the subject matter as
classified because this would raise significant separation-of-powers
issues between the executive and the judiciary.8 6 Specifically, if the judiciary could not hear cases involving matters the executive deemed classified, then this would violate the judiciary's role to "say what the law
"187

The Ninth Circuit explained that outside the narrow Totten bar on
secret contracts between a plaintiff and the government, the Reynolds
framework for rendering privileged evidence unavailable piece by piece
instead of dismissing a suit altogether better prevents overreaching by
the executive branch with respect to secret conduct." The court
80. Id.
81. Id. at 953.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 954.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876)).
86. Id. at 955-56.
87. Id. at 955 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
88. Id. "Accordingly, we conclude that if a lawsuit is not predicated on the existence of a
secret agreement between the plaintiff and the government, Totten does not apply, and the subject
matter of the suit is not a state secret." Id. at 956.
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explained that "[uinlike Totten, the Reynolds framework accomodates
these division-of-powers concerns by upholding the President's secrecy
interests without categorically immunizing the CIA or its partners from
judicial scrutiny." 9 Following this logic, the court concluded that the
case was improperly dismissed at the outset because the lawsuit did not
seek to enforce a secret contract between the plaintiffs and the
government. 90
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the government's assertion that the
case should be dismissed under Reynolds because privileged information
would be necessary to make out the plaintiffs' prima facie case. 9 ' The
court explained that Reynolds applies only to evidence and not to the
underlying facts of the suit. 92 Thus, a case may proceed if certain evidence is privileged so long as the plaintiff is not prevented from making
a prima facie case and the defendant is not prevented from making a
valid defense. 93 The court explained that at the motion-to-dismiss stage,
the government was asking the court to "prospectively acknowledge
hypothetical claims of privilege that the government has not yet raised
and the district court has not yet considered."9 4 Jeppesen had not
answered the complaint and discovery had not began." The only relevant determination then was whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted, which they had. 96 Thus, the court
could not determine whether the Reynolds privilege applied because
there had been no discovery request for specific evidence and the government had not made a formal claim of privilege as to specific evidence.97 The court explained that:
On remand, the government must assert the privilege with respect to
secret evidence (not classified information), and the district court
must determine what evidence is privileged and whether any such
evidence is indispensible either to the plaintiffs' prima facie case or
to a valid defense otherwise available to Jeppesen. Only if privileged
evidence is indispensible to either party should it dismiss the
89. Id. at 956.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 956-57. However, the Ninth Circuit took the opposite position en banc, affirming
dismissal of the case under the Reynolds privilege. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614
F.3d 1070, 1085 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
92. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 957.
93. Id. at 958; see also Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that the case must be dismissed if invocation of the privilege prevents the defendant from making
a defense).
94. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 960.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 961 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1953)).
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complaint. 9 8
In Mohamed, the Ninth Circuit attempted to limit executive overuse
of the state secrets privilege, holding that civil suits by victims of the
extraordinary rendition program should not automatically be dismissd at
the pleading stage. 99 Instead, what is secret for purposes of the privilege
must be evaluated by the court on a case-by-case basis.'" The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that information may be classified, but this cannot automatically render it secret under the privilege without giving the executive branch unlimited power over what can be litigated.o0
The Ninth's Circuit's holding in Mohamed strives to prevent executive invocation of the state secrets privilege merely to hide embarrassment or control what is litigated. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
expressly stated that "U]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers."10 2 Following this
logic, the Ninth Circuit further warned of the potential for executive
abuse of the privilege in Mohamed when it explained that courts should
be wary of invocation of the privilege as to "classified" information that
is aimed at preventing government embarassment as opposed to true
military secrets. 0 3

IV.

ANALYSIS: CONTROLLING PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND DISCOURSE IN
THE WAR ON TERROR THROUGH EXPANSIVE CLAIMS
OF STATE SECRETS

A.

An Uncertain Balance of Powers Calls for Change

An analysis of the tensions and arguments posed by the Mohamed
case raise several significant issues. First, government invocation of the

state secrets doctrine blocks victims of the extraordinary rendition program from having their claims heard in American courts. Thus, in the
context of the War on Terror, the state secrets doctrine works to control
public exposure to the United States government's participation in torture. Next, the uncertainty in the state secrets doctrine and its recent
expansion in favor of executive power suggests that it is time for a
change. 0 4
98. Id. at 962.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 955-56.
102. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8-10.
103. See Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 959 n.7.
104. See, e.g., Daniel J. Huyck, Comment, Fade to Black: El-Masri v. United States Validates
the Use of the State Secrets Privilege to Dismiss "ExtraordinaryRendition" Claims, 17 MmqN. J.
INT'L L. 435, 456-61 (2008) (explaining that the El-Masri court conflated Totten and Reynolds
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Keeping the Secret

The contemporary use of the state secrets doctrine to dismiss damages claims by victims of extraordinary rendition' keeps American
human rights abuses out of the courts and the public view, hiding a disturbing yet ironic component of the War on Terror.106 That is, by kidnapping and torturing suspected terrorists, the United States is fighting
terror with terror, engaging in the type of extreme practices that it seeks
to combat. The government's refusal to give victims of the extraordinary
rendition program a day in court is also the government's refusal to
admit its wrongful participation in their detention and torture. In fact, the
government's actions reinforce a hierarchy of power that suggests that
subjugating foreign enemies through torture is acceptable and should go
unchecked. 0 7
The executive branch has an incentive to control the public perception of foreign policy measures10 8 because a president's power to maintain favor during a time of war is shaped by public perception and
approval of the war. The executive thus has a strong interest in how the
media frames its foreign policy actions, as well as the actions of the
legislature and the courts, which collectively form the perceptions of the
American public.'" For example, the Bush Administration strategically
framed the public perception of the War on Terror, shifting the focus
from war on a country to war on an ideology, a war on fear." 0 This
point is illustrated in the now famous "torture memos" from the Attorney General's Office regarding the legality of the Bush Administration's
and that the state secrets doctrine has been increasingly used by the government to dismiss entire
claims rather than exclude certain privileged pieces of evidence).
105. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
106. See Dahlia Lithwick, Torture Roulette: The Obama Administration Has Picked the Worst
Possible Casefor Its First Torture Trial, SLATE, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.slate.comlid/2238568/

pagenum/all/ (explaining that no torture victim has had his day in court and no court has ruled on
the legality of the Bush Administration's torture policies).
107. See Dorothy Roberts, Torture and the Biopolitics of Race, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 244

(2008) (explaining that the United States' history of maintaining a racial hierarchy through
physical domination and torture combined with mass media representations of torture normalize
torture as a way to maintain the dominant power structure and that this hierarchy is reinforced
through our torture of suspected terrorists abroad).
108. See Rebecca A. Glazier & Amber E. Boydstun, Media (Non)Conformity to Executive
Framing of the War on Terror 2-3 (Aug. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http:l/
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451384 (an insightful work on how President Bush
had an interest in shaping media portrayals of foreign policy during the War on Terror and how
the media deviated from executive interests).
109. Id. at 3.
110. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword, Article II: The Uses and Abuses of Executive Power,

62 U. MIAMi L. REv. 181, 211 (2008) (discussing the claims of inherent executive power that
arose in the context of the War on Terror, which destabilized traditional notions of republican
government and sought to justify the government's actions through military necessity).
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interrogation tactics of suspected terrorists held abroad, which repeatedly referred to the War on Terror as an "unprecedented" type of conflict that required the actions taken against suspected terrorists."'
Indeed, it was through this lens of the War on Terror as a new, unprecedented war that expansive invocations of executive power were justified
in the public perception.1 12 It is in this context that one must evaluate the
executive's current justifications for expansive use of the state secrets
privilege and how the executive invokes the privilege to block allegations of torture from exposure through American courts.
A comparison of the government's disparate treatment of the
Mohamed case with the government's case against Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the mastermind behind the September 11 ' attacks, illustrates the government's use of the state secrets doctrine to block public
exposure to the United States government's participation in torture, and
to control the public perception of the War on Terror in general. Like in
Mohamed, the litigation against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will likely

involve allegations of CIA torture and will potentially reveal government policies condoning the torture of suspected terrorists. Just as the
plaintiffs' claims in Mohamed would involve Jeppesen's part in CIA
detainment and torture, many speculate that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's defense will focus on his alleged water-boarding and forced confession while detained at Guantanamo Bay." 3 Yet, the government has
made no claim of state secrets in the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed case,
nor is one expected.' 1 4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed case during the en banc rehearing of Mohamed on December 15, 2009."" Specifically, Ben Wizner, counsel for the plaintiffs,
explained that the government will not seek dismissal of the proceedings
against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as it did in Mohamed simply because
some privileged material may be involved.' 16 Instead, any evidence will
be assessed piece by piece to determine whether it is privileged and
11l. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, to
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't. of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http:/lwww.
justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-combatantsoutsideunitedstates.pdf.
112. See Iglesias, supra note 110, at 211.
113. See Hannity: 'Terror on Trial' Special: Who Is KSM? (FOX television broadcast Dec. 11,
2009), transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,580177,00.html (featuring
Rudy Guiliani, who explains that the defense in the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed case will likely
focus on his water-boarding and attempt to exaggerate Bush-era policies and will focus on what
America did wrong as opposed to horrible acts of terrorism).
114. Oral Argument from Rehearing En Banc at 8:02, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-15693EB), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
media/view-subpage.php?pkjid-0000004702.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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exclusion is required."' Wizner explained that this is how the Mohamed
case should proceed."I Indeed, in Reynolds, the Supreme Court required
evidence to be assessed in this manner, excluding evidence if the privilege applies, but continuing with the litigation using non-privileged
evidence.' 19
When the panel questioned Department of Justice attorney Douglas
Letter about this issue and why the government demands dismissal of
the Mohamed case at the pleading stage, Letter attempted to differentiate
the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed case because it is a criminal matter.120 He
explained that the Attorney General must believe he can proceed on
non-privileged material and that this is different from the case in
Mohamed where Attorney General Eric Holder found that the case could
not proceed without revealing state secrets and accordingly made a formal claim of privilege.121 However, the distinction between a civil case
brought by victims of extreme interrogation and a criminal case against
a victim of extreme interrogation does not clearly present a reason why
the government would invoke the privilege in one instance, but not
another where the government's questionable and allegedly secret interrogation operations would be revealed in either instance.
A more obvious explanation for the disparate treatment of these
cases is the government's interests in keeping the matters private, or in
making them public. The government's reasons for invoking the state
secrets doctrine to dismiss Mohamed at the pleading stage are clear. Litigating Mohamed in a public forum would reveal the government's participation in the extraordinary rendition program and its involvement in
the torture of suspected terrorists, many of whom the government later
released without bringing criminal charges. 122 This is an embarrassment
to the government that reveals the dark side of its foreign policy.
Conversely, in the case against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the
government has not invoked the state secrets privilege to dismiss this
claim because it wants the case litigated in a public forum.12 3 In fact, the
government actively sought to hold Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's trial in
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (U.S. 1953).
120. Oral Argument from Rehearing En Banc, supra note 114, at 57:15.
121. Id.
122. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 949-51 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff
Al-Rawi was released after his confinement and torture; the other plaintiffs were convicted of
trivial crimes. Id.
123. See Lithwick, supra note 106 (explaining that some suspect that the Obama
Administration wants the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed trial to be the sole forum for litigating the
legality of torture).
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a civil court in Manhattan,12 4 a move that clearly sought to make these
matters public.12 5 The government has a strong interest in holding
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed responsible for a horrible crime, bringing
some closure to the victims, and maintaining its role as a combatant of
terrorism.
A comparison of Mohamed with the case against Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed reveals how the executive's interest in the public perception
of the War on Terror affects which cases the government seeks to keep
out of the courts through invocation of the state secrets privilege. In fact,
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's case may be the first adjudication involving allegations of CIA torture litigated in an American court.' 2 6 Some
speculate that the Obama Administration would like the New York trial
of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to be the sole forum for determining the
legality of government-sanctioned torture.127 Specifically, the Obama
Administration maintains the extraordinary rendition program and has
actively sought dismissal of cases involving claims of government-sanctioned torture.128 Thus, only addressing the issue in a case involving an
individual charged with an unthinkable crime lessens the impact of the
government's abuse of the perpetrator. As one critic put it:
KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed] is a monster. Nobody disputes that
he was central to the planning and execution of the attacks on the
Twin Towers and the Pentagon. If the trial of a man who was instrumental in killing thousands of innocent Americans becomes the sole
forum in which the legality of prisoner abuse is to be litigated, public
sentiment in favor of torture will only grow stronger..

.

. The Obama

administration will have been instrumental in selling the public on
future torture in a way that is even more distressing than its recent
124. See Margot Williams, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/khalid-shaikhmohammedlindex.html?scp= 1spot&sq=khalid%20shaikh%20mohammed&st=cse (explaining that the Obama Administration
sought to hold Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's trial in lower Manhattan's financial district, but the
outcry of New Yorkers who disagreed with holding the trial in Manhattan for security, financial,
and emotional reasons caused the Administration to seek a different forum).
125. As of November 20, 2010, the forum for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's trial remains
undetermined. In fact, many suspect that a civilian trial is no longer likely because it may
embarrass the government and convey weakness in a time of war. See David Jackson, Obama's
Plan to Try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in Civilian Court May Be Done, THE OvAL (Nov. 18, 2010,

8:47 AM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2010/11/obamas-plan-to-tryksm-in-civilian-court-may-be-done/1.
126. See Lithwick, supra note 106.
127. Id.
128. See Glenn Greenwald, Salon Radio: Critical State Secrets Hearing Today,

SALON

(Dec.

15, 2009), http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/radio/2009/12/15/wizner/index.html?source=
newsletter (discussing the Obama Administration's continuance of Bush policies with respect to
the state secrets doctrine).
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efforts to immunize the torturers themselves. 129
Certainly, our government has an understandable interest in holding terrorists responsible for the deaths of innocent victims and showing the
world that this behavior is wrong. However, it is also time that our
nation leads by example and provides victims of abusive government
practices with redress in American courts. The government's expansive
use of the state secrets doctrine to dismiss cases involving human rights
abuses committed by Americans during the War on Terror illustrates
that in its current state, the executive invokes the privilege to control
government embarrassment by policing what claims are heard in American courts and in the court of public opinion.130
C.

Divergence in the Application of the State Secrets Doctrine as it
Relates to Claims by Victims of ExtraordinaryRendition
Suggests the Need for Clarificationand Reform

The former split between the Fourth Circuit's analysis in El-Masri
and the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Mohamed illustrates a significant
point of tension in the application of the state secrets privilege. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit interprets the state secrets privilege to permit
dismissal of an entire claim when the subject matter of the suit may
involve privileged information.' While a broad reading of Totten may
permit such a result, to allow the government to invoke the privilege to
dismiss a claim any time it involves potentially secret information gives
the executive the power to determine what claims may be heard and
what government abuses may go unchecked, violating the judiciary's
constitutional duty "to say what the law is."l 32
The uncertainty in the state secrets case law, and what many deem
to be an unwarranted expansion of the doctrine in favor of unbridled
executive power, suggests that it is time for Congress or the Supreme
Court to clarify the doctrine.' 3 3 Specifically, the government now
invokes the Totten doctrine allowing complete dismissal of a claim,
which began during the Civil War era to prevent spies from enforcing
contract claims against the government, to hide grave human rights
abuses, and to deny access to the courts to individuals who have legiti129. See Lithwick, supra note 106.
130. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 959 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009).
131. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a civil
claim by a victim of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program at the pleading stage because the
matter could not be litigated without disclosing state secrets, despite other available nonprivileged evidence that could have been used to support his claim).
132. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 955 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
133. See Huyck, supra note 104, at 456-61.
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mate claims against our government. 1 34 Further, courts understand Reynolds, which requires a specific claim of privilege, to permit dismissal of
a claim before discovery if the case will involve confidential subject
matter.135 As the Mohamed Court recognized, Reynolds never suggested
such a result.136 In fact, Reynolds required courts to asses whether the
government properly invoked the claim of privilege and to exclude the
evidence accordingly. 137 This does not call for a complete dismissal of a
case-merely for exclusion of privileged evidence. 38
The expansive use of the state secrets privilege to dismiss entire
cases instead of excluding specific evidence shows that courts are
accepting executive claims of privilege "without conducting any meaningful review of the invocation of the privilege." 1 39 Courts must heed the
warnings set forth by the Supreme Court in Reynolds and the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed and take a more active role assessing executive claims
of the state secrets privilege to prevent the "intolerable abuses" that
result when judicial control over what evidence may be heard is "abdicated to the caprice of executive officers."l 40 The remainder of this note
calls for the judiciary to take a more active role in assessing executive
claims of privilege through in camera review of the evidence in
question.
D.

Towards Righting Our Wrongs: In Camera Judicial Review as an
Alternative to Dismissal of Cases by Victims of
ExtraordinaryRendition at the PleadingStage

The government's expansive use of the state secrets doctrine to dismiss cases involving human rights abuses committed during the war on
terror illustrates that in its current state, the executive invokes the doctrine to control government embarrassment by policing which claims
reach American courts and the court of public opinion.141 The executive
is essentially creating its own revisionist history of the War on Terror,
which seeks to minimize American participation in torture and other war
134. See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311; see also Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 943.
135. See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 311. The Ninth Circuit also takes this position in the rehearing

en banc decision that affirmed the district court's dismissal of Mohamed. Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("Here, our detailed Reynolds
analysis reveals that the claims and possible defenses are so infused with state secrets that the risk
of disclosing them is both apparent and inevitable.").
136. See Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 957.

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 99, 117 (2007).

140. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953); Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 959 n.7.
141. See Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 959 n.7.
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crimes. 14 2 The Supreme Court or Congress must clarify and reform the
state secrets doctrine to provide victims of torture with a means to have
their claims heard and to bring some accountability to the American
government. If the United States accepts greater accountability for mistreated victims of the War on Terror, it would likely reduce anti-American sentiment among Al-Qaeda and Middle Eastern countries involved
in conflict with the United States. Scholars have commented on how the
detention of suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay has fueled antiAmerican rhetoric.1 43 Denying those detained and tortured in violation
of international law from redress in American courts only exacerbates
this effect.
An ideal solution to expansive use of the state secrets privilege is to
foreclose dismissal of cases at the pleading stage, where no discovery
has taken place and where the government has not made any formal
claim of privilege as to specific evidence. The Ninth Circuit in Mohamed
correctly determined that analyzing evidence piece by piece and assessing the government's specific claims of privilege as to that evidence is
likely the best compromise between the government's interest in protecting state secrets and the plaintiffs' rights to have their claims heard."
This would also bring application of the state secrets privilege within the
original scope of Reynolds, which required judges to make an independent assessment of whether the executive properly invoked the state
secrets privilege.'
In order to facilitate judicial assessment of whether the state secrets
privilege applies, in camera review of the evidence in question would
provide an independent check on executive invocation of the privilege.14 6 This would also ensure that the government makes a specific
claim of privilege, instead of a general claim that secrets will inevitably
be disclosed, warranting dismissal at the outset as in Mohamed.
However, disclosure of privileged evidence is a major concern with
in camera judicial review of military matters. 14 7 In fact, the fear of interfering with military secrets has likely contributed to the circuit courts'
inclination to accept executive claims of privilege when made. For
example, in Reynolds, the Supreme Court explained that when the court
142. See Glenn Greenwald, The Crime of Not "Looking Backward," SALoN, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.salon.com/newslopinion/glenn-greenwald/2010/01/19/guantanamo/index.html.
143. Interview by Glenn Greenwald with Gregory Johnston, Ph.D., Candidate in Near Eastern
Studies at Princeton University, on Salon Radio (Dec. 24, 2009), transcript available at http://

www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn-greenwald/radio/2009/12/24/gjohnsen-transcript/index.html.
144. Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 962.
145. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.

146. See Huyck, supra note 104, at 469.
147. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
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is satisfied that the state secrets privilege is proper in a given case
because "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters . . . the court should not jeopardize the
security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers."l 4 8
Despite this statement, it is clear that increased judicial review is necessary to provide a check on expansive invocation of the privilege. In camera review of the evidence would provide this check, increasing judicial
review and limiting expansive invocation of the privilege for improper
means, such as preventing government embarrassment.
Politicians have also recognized that increased judicial review of
executive claims of privilege is a necessary component of state secrets
reform. 149 For example, The State Secrets Protection Act of 2009 was
introduced in the 111th Congress and would codify standards and procedures to be used in civil litigation when the government makes a claim
of the state secrets privilege."'o This bill would require courts to
examine the actual evidence that the government is asserting the privilege against to determine whether the claim of privilege is valid."'1
In camera judicial review of the claimed secret evidence would be a
significant change from Reynolds, which explicitly stated that the judge
must evaluate whether the claim of privilege is proper without discovering the privileged information. 15 2 However, Reynolds failed to provide a
framework that would necessarily place a check on the executive's ability to determine what evidence is excluded as privileged and thus which
claims may be heard in certain cases. Requiring in camera inspection of
the evidence would prevent executive overreaching and expansive use of
the state secrets privilege by "allow[ing] an independent judiciary to
determine the merits of the privilege and not the party claiming the
privilege."15 3
Further, in contrast to other alternatives, in camera review provides
a more viable solution towards giving victims of extraordinary rendition
a meaningful opportunity to be heard in American courts. For example,
bringing suit against third parties and not the government, as in
Mohamed, illustrates one solution for torture victims seeking compensation. Under Totten, courts dismiss claims as involving state secrets if
148. Id.
149. See State Secrets Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Lm,
supra note 17.

150. See Liu, supra note 17, at 12.
151. Id. at 13.
152. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.

153. Huyck, supra note 104, at 469.
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instituted to enforce a contract against the government, 154 but the same
concerns should not bar suits against third parties. Thus, courts could
clarify the scope of the state secrets doctrine, as in Mohamed, and find
that the Totten bar does not apply to cases involving third-party military
contractors. The evidence revealed would still be limited if harmful to
the government, but at least these individuals would have their day in
court."' Further, holding private companies liable for damages to these
victims would discourage them from contracting with the government
for services that result in human rights abuses.1 5 6
Allowing suits against private contractors of the government to proceed on a more expansive basis could provide a potential solution for
individuals as against private contractors, but would likely be ineffective. Because Reynolds states that the judiciary cannot asses the actual
evidence the government invokes the state secrets privilege against,1 57
even if a claim by a torture victim against a private contractor were
permitted to proceed, it would have to be dismissed if the government
made a proper claim of privilege and the privileged evidence was central
to the claim. The problem that exists in the contemporary law would still
be present. Specifically, the judiciary cannot make an independent
assessment of whether the executive is properly claiming the privilege or
is simply hiding embarrassing and authoritarian actions because the judiciary is unable to discover what the evidence is.'
What the state secrets doctrine ultimately needs is clarification. The
Supreme Court declined to hear El-Masri's case' 59 and thus declined to
limit the state secrets privilege, which has unclear boundaries1 60 and is
widely criticized for its expansive invocation. If the state secrets privi154. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876).
155. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., Interrogation Memos Provide Further Reason
to Give Torture Victims Day in Court, Says ACLU, (Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.
aclunc.org/news/press-releases/interrogation-memos-provide-further-reason-to-give-torture
victims..day-incourt,_says-aclu.shtml (explaining that victims of extraordinary rendition should
not be prevented from having their day in court because rendition and its practices are no longer
secret because President Obama declassified memoranda from the Office of Legal Counsel
outlining these activities).
156. See Jamie A. Baron Rodriguez, Article & Essay, Torture on Trial: How the Alien Tort
Statute May Expose the United States Government's Illegal "Extraordinary Rendition" Program
Through Its Use of a Private Contractor, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & Comp. L. 189, 205 (2009)

(explaining that perhaps private contractors that aid the United States government in conducting
the extraordinary rendition program, like Jeppesen, should be held liable to the torture victims so
private corporations will hesitate to assist the government in these activities).
157. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
158. See id.

159. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
947 (2007).
160. See Huyck, supra note 104, at 453-55 (explaining that there is no clear consensus
between the circuits with respect to the correct application of the Reynolds test).
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lege is clearly limited to bar the use of specific privileged evidence, then
the claims may proceed in the absence of the privileged evidence as with
other evidentiary claims of privilege, such as the privilege against selfincrimination.161 In Mohamed, the Ninth Circuit explained that the state
secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege and should accordingly
exclude specific evidence instead of requiring dismissal of the entire
case. 16 2 As one writer noted in the wake of the EI-Masri decision, if the
Supreme Court redirects the state secrets doctrine "to its common law
foundation as an evidentiary rule," then this may return "the proper balance between the need for individual redress for wrongs and the protection of valid national secrets."l 63
V.

CONCLUSION

The War on Terror has complicated American moral and legal
frameworks. Among these complications, the state secrets doctrine has
shifted from an evidentiary rule to a complete bar on certain suits,
preventing victims of extreme interrogation from having their day in an
American court. In Mohamed, the Ninth Circuit attempted to limit executive overuse of the state secrets privilege, holding that civil suits by
victims of the extraordinary rendition program should not be dismissed
at the pleading stage.' 64 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that what is
secret for purposes of the privilege must be evaluated by the court on a
case-by-case basis. 6 5 Thus, the Ninth's Circuit's holding sought to prevent executive invocation of the state secrets privilege merely to hide
embarrassment or control what is litigated.'6 6
The Ninth Circuit's analysis and contemporary state secrets jurisprudence reveals that the state secrets doctrine currently functions to
keep questionable government actions out of the public view, effectively
controlling the public perception and discourse surrounding the United
States government's actions in the War on Terror. Further, by refusing
to give victims of the extraordinary rendition program a day in court, the
government refuses to admit its wrongful participation in their detention
and torture.
The expansive use of the state secrets privilege to dismiss entire
161. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 957 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The
Supreme Court could not be more clear that 'the privilege which protects military and state
secrets' is a privilege within 'the law of evidence,' just like the 'analogous privilege, the privilege
against self-incrimination."' (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8)).
162. Id.
163. Huyck, supra note 104, at 472.
164. See Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 960-61.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 959 n.7.
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cases instead of excluding specific evidence shows that courts are
accepting executive claims of privilege "without conducting any meaningful review of the invocation of the privilege."' 6 1 Courts must heed the
warnings set forth by the Supreme Court in Reynolds and the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed and take a more active role assessing executive claims
of the state secrets privilege to prevent the "intolerable abuses" that
result when judicial control over what evidence may be heard is "abdicated to the caprice of executive officers." 16
In order to facilitate judicial assessment of whether the state secrets
privilege applies, in camera review of the evidence in question would
provide an independent check on executive invocation of the privilege.169 This would also ensure that a specific claim of privilege is made,
instead of a general claim that secrets will inevitably be disclosed warranting dismissal at the outset. Without in camera review, the judiciary
cannot make an independent assessment of whether the executive is
properly claiming the privilege, or is simply hiding embarrassing and
authoritarian actions. The state secrets doctrine needs clear limits and
clarification in order to provide victims of the extraordinary rendition
program an opportunity to be heard and to bring accountability to the
American government.

167. Lyons, supra note 139, at 117.
168. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1953); see Mohamed, 579 F.3d at 959 n.7.
169. See Huyck, supra note 104, at 469.
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